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Abstract 
The paper extends and integrates the previous two-sector general mul-
tiple equilibria model into a small, open economy with monopolistic com-
petition, increasing returns to scale, and public input ( pure public good). 
It provides a model that illustrates the effect of public input (public provi-
wSion of infrastructure or government industrial policy) on national income 
at different stages of development. 
In this model, there are three equilibria. The first equilibrium {equilibrium 
X) describes an economy which is completely specialized in producing a 
capital intensive and high technology final goods X. The second equilib-
rium {equilibrium Y) describes an economy which is completely specialized 
in producing and labor intensive and low technology goods Y. The third 
equilibrium is the diversified equilibrium which an economy produces both 
good X and good Y. 
It partially confirms the result ofRodrik (1996) that government policy 
(level of public input) can help the economy to find a more desirable equi-
librium. However, it is subject to certain conditions. This study explicitly 
points out those conditions. 
It also shows that an increase in the supply of public input does not nec-
essarily increase the national income. Again, a certain sufficient condition 
is identified for government policy to increase national income. 
Moreover, this study points out the optimal level of public input for 
each complete specialization equilibrium and provides a comparison of their 
sizes. 
Most importantly, this study gives a clear welfare ranking between dif-
ferent equilibria. It shows that equilibrium X always dominates equilibrium 
Y for a given level of public input. Furthermore, given the optimal level of 
public input for equilibrium X and equilibrium Y respectively, equilibrium 
X dominates equilibrium Y again. 
It is possible that the mismatch of the optimal level of public input 
for one equilibrium and another equilibrium will adversely affect national 
income. The most salient finding is the mismatch between equilibrium Y 
and the optimal level of public input for equilibrium X {0^), is inferior to 
any other possible equilibria with an optimal public input, G*. Equilibrium 
X can be interpreted as an economy which is at a developed state. On the 
other hand, equilibrium Y can be interpreted as an economy which is at 
the developing state. As a result, it is more safer to adopt a conservative 
public input level for developing countries. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Appropriate Role of Government in Economic Development. 
This thesis starts with a simple but unsettling question: what is the appro-
priate role of government in economic development? Much attention in ac:ademic 
discourse has been given to this question. 
In neoclassical economics, the only role for government in the development 
process is to provide a stable and reliable legal framework to promote domestic 
and international competition. The first, and the last job, for the government is to 
get the basics right. The "basics" include the relatively small share of government 
in total expenditures, relatively small fiscal deficits, policy reforms 8,chieving real-
istic real exchange rates and relatively and increasingly open trade and payment, 
regimes, the move toward market interest rate and exchange rate, and releasing 
restrictions on the labor market. 
Economic theory, starting with Keynes(1935) and Samuelson (1954). justifies 
a crucial role for government in both the efficient and equitable sense. The argu-
ments rest on several traditional notions of market failure, such as: externalities 
in consumption and production, scale economies, failures in related markets, nori-
excludability, information problems with benefits and costs, and the need to a(^hieve 
non-monetary objective such as equity or poverty alleviation. Keynes(1935) in his 
pioneering book "General Theory of Employment, Interest, And Money” showed 
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that an increase in government spending will increase national income. The argu-
ment had dominated intellectual thinking for more than fifty years. Development 
economists, like Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurske and Kuznets, recognize that the role 
of government is to compensate the "market failure.，，The developing countries 
are normally regarded as facing a serious "structural rigidities" ^ problem. In other 
words, the widespread absence of markets in developing countries mean that prices 
cannot perform their coordination role. In the 1940s and 1950s, these economists 
believed that markets in developing countries functioned imperfectly. The gov-
ernment, which is assumed to be a benevolent social guardian, should have an 
advantage in the allocation of resources over the market. The success of Keyne-
sian activism in fighting the Great Depression in western countries, the success 
of the Marshall Plan in the reconstniction of the economies of western Europe, 
and the achievements of the Russian and China industrialization drive in 1930s 
and 1950s respectively, had raised a question to the extent of the power of the 
"invisible hand." 
In contrast, Krueger (1990) said "One of the lessons of experience with de-
velopment is that governments are not omniscient, selfless, social guardians and 
corrections are not costless." By the 1970s and the early 1980s, governments in 
most, developing countries could not perform their expected role successfully. As 
Knieger (1990) pointed out, in many developing countries, "government failures" 
clearly outweighed market failures. 
1 "structural rigidities" means that due to the different institutional features, the developing 
countries' economies have a low price elasticities and responsiveness to incentives" 
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Nikita Khruschev said, “ Politicians are the same all over. They promise to 
build a bridge even where there is no river." According to Knieger (1990), there 
are two kinds of government failures. The first one is omission. Failures of omission 
includes unbelievably high-cost state enterprises, engage in a variety of economic 
activities which are not traditionally associated with the public sector. The second 
one is the failures of omission which include the deterioration of infrastructure and 
failure to maintain a stable macroeconomic environment. Both failures result in 
a possibility that government interventions may lead to a greater deviation from 
efficient use of resources than that produced by the market. 
1.2 Government and Infrastructure 
The debate inevitably remains inconclusive. However, most economists be-
lieve that government will do a better job in the area of providing infrastructure. 
Infrastructure has some aspects of public goods. The number of consumers for 
infrastructure is very large. However, due to their relatively small capacity, they 
have, little or even no, opportunity to reward good providers or penalize poor 
ones. These characteristics provide some basis for believing that the market may 
not function well. 
Goltz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) analyzed the productivity effects of public in-
frastructure in the context of the general equilibrium model. The results suggest 
that there are two different effects of public infrastructure on productivity. The 
direct output effect of infrastructure supports the traditional production function 
studies. Moreover, a more subtle effect of the public infrastructure is to increase 
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the number of manufacturing establishments. In other words, the increase in public 
infrastructure will lead to an increase in the number of firms in the manufactur-
ing sector. Owing to the assumption of increasing returns to scale in the public 
manufacturing sector, productivity rises as well. 
Stiglitz (1996) identified that there are four salient activities for the government 
in promoting economic development, especially on export-oriented economy: the 
provision of infrastructure; preferential access to capital and foreign exchange; the 
development of export markets; and licensing and designing regulations to enhance 
the reputation of the country's exports. In Taiwan, according to the Six-Year Eco-
nomic Development Plan (1990-1996) of the Council for Economic Planning and 
Development, gQvernment investment increases by 1.67 Percent of GNP per year 
for six years. In Hong Kong, the government has nearly completed the vast public 
investment project on the new airport. Since 1991, the Hong Kong government 
has invested over 20 billion US dollars on the new airport. Complementary to the 
work of Goltz-Eakin and Lovely (1996), this study captures the essence of infras-
tructure in the form of pure public good instead of tax and subsidy. It hopes to 
help in bringing out the understanding of infrastructure in another way. 
1.3 Division of Labor, Intermediate Inputs and Economic Development 
Adam Smith, "This division of labor...is the necessary, though very slow and 
gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view 
no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing 
for another." Since Adam Smith, economists believed that the wealth of a nation 
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can be attributed partly to the division of labor. Today, it is always interpreted 
as a wide variety of specialized intermediate goods and services. Producer services 
(e.g. banking, auditing, consulting, wholesale services and transportation), which 
are usually regarded as non-tradable goods, are clear examples of such inputs. 
In developed countries, final goods industries make superior use of highly spe-
cialized capital goods and enjoy a wide variety of producer service. With a wide 
range of specialized inputs and producer services, firms in the consumer sector 
adopt more indirect ways of production, thus attaining a higher level of produc-
tivity. It is evident that some economies ,which are underdeveloped, have a small 
and limited of intermediate sector. The underdeveloped economies produce only 
a limited range of intermediate inputs and producer services, the final goods in-
dustry is then forced to adopt a more primitive modes of production. Most firms 
produce goods or iise techniques that rely intensively on direct or raw labor. Those 
economies clearly cannot reap the benefits that from the division of labor, and few 
resources are then allocated to produce specialized inputs. We can also observe , 
that most developed countries are associated with a greater intermediate scK'tor. In 
turn, developing countries are usually associated with a limited size of intcnnediate 
sector. 
Concern for the developing economies to develop their intermediate sector is a 
coordination problem. Production and investment decisions in the upstream and 
downstream industries will be interdependent. When these decisions are made by 
individual firms, coordination failures can result in underdevelopment of both up-
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stream and downstream industries. One traditional example is the linkage effect of 
downstream and upstream industries: developing a steel-manufacturing industry 
does not help unless there is also an automobile industry. By the same token, 
investing in a automobile industry does not pay unless there is a steel manufactur-
ing industry. It creates a role for the government to coordinate the two activities. 
Moreover, when there is an increasing returns to scale in either sector, the problem 
of coordination failures become more crucial. 
Stiglitz (1996) criticizes such coordination failures as impersuasive. since he 
tended that problem can be overcome by the presence of international trade. It 
is possible to develop a steel manufacturing industry by importing steel. Again, 
it is possible to have a automobile market by exporting steel to countries produc-
ing automobile. As a result, coordination failures are sensible when th t� input is 
nontradable. Transaction cost (e.g. transportation cost) is another argiinrent that 
makes coordination failures possible. Producer services (e.g. banking, auditing, 
consulting, wholesale services and transportation), which are usually regarded as 
non-tradable goods, are clear example of such inputs. The imperfect tradablility 
can be a result of specialized labor service. The decision of an individual oii human 
capital investment depends on the demand of particular skill and the availability of 
complementary skills in the economy. Both arguments explain why importing the 
intermediate goods does not serve as a perfect substitute for domestic intermediate 
inputs. Thus, the arguments provide a rationale for government intervention. 
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1.4 Relationships Amon^ Infrastructure, Intermediate Inputs and Final Goods 
Investment in infrastructure can increase the productivity of industries. East-
erly and Rebelo (1993) showed cross-economy estimates that infrastructure invest-
ment has a high payoff for economic growth. In the context of the linkage effect 
between upstream industry and downstream industry, the investment in infrastruc-
ture can lower the cost of downstream industry. Therefore, the demand for the 
product of the upstream industry will increase. Owing to the presence of increas-
ing returns to scale, an increase in demand for the upstream industry pro(]iict will 
lower the production cost of the intermediate inputs. As a result, government, (:an 
help to solve the coordination failures by increasing investment in infrastructure. 
On the contrary, we need to clarify the opportunity cost of public investment 
in infrastructure. The increase in public investment in infrastructure can result in 
a decrease in the resources available to the intermediate sector. With increasing 
returns to scale, when there is a decrease in the number of firms in the upstream 
industry (intermediate sector), the marginal product of intermediate iiii)uts will 
decrease. In other words, there exists a trade-off between the intermediate and the 
public sector. 
When there is a significant increase in the public investment of infrastructure, 
the contribution of the public investment to the economy will be negative. Cain 
(1997) reminds us that this does not happen only in the developing countries, a 
rush by public-sector investing in infrastructure has been always observ(�d in the 
US economic history. From 1812 to 1837, about US$ 188 million was invested in 
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canals. Government contributed nearly 73% of total investment. Fishlow (1972) 
estimated that the total investment in railroads up to 1860 was in excess of US$ 
1209 billion. In the South, about 50% of the fund came from government. Around 
the turn of the century, the government focused on the building of water and 
sanitation system. In recent years, local government was encouraged to develop 
mass transit railways and highways. After careful review of the railroads in the US 
economic history, Cain (1997) concludes that the return rate from even the most 
successful investment may be only better than the forgone investment oppor tunity. 
Government failure can have several possible explanations. The first one is 
that the government is not an selfless agent. The pioneering public choice analysis 
of government investment might be Tullock's (1959) classic discussion of major-
ity rule. The influence of interest groups is the major factor for the government 
decision. The classic example of road repair^ nicely illustrates how governments 
can become too large under the majority rule. Becker (1983,1985) has developed 
a model of the influence of interest groups. Government programs must be manu-
factured. The manufacturer is the government bureau. Government is also subject 
to the problem of incomplete information. Government bureaucracies can be re-
garded as an independent force, which possibly may lead to increasing iii public 
investment. A bureau will then wish to charge a higher price for a given output. 
2 Tolliick describe an example in which a society of 100 farmers votes on proposals to access 
roads, each of few only benefit a few farmers. With a majority rule, a coalition formed by 51 
farmer can win for whatever outcomes. With the assumption of equal bearing of tlie cost for 
repairing the road, the 51 farmers in the coalition pay only 51 percent of the total cost. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the coalition will choose a higher quality or quantity level of road than 
they would if they had to cover the full costs. 
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The extra revenue can be used to offer a higher salaries, more leisure and more 
prerequisites. The another salient incompetence of government is incomplete in-
formation. With the presence of market imperfection, there is no evidencte to show 
that government will enjoy more information than the market . In many develop-
ing countries, detailed statistical data for the economies are either inadequate or 
not available. As a result, government always find if difficult in catching up with 
the dynamic changes in the economy. 
Rodrik (1996), provides a general framework to demonstrate the coordination 
failures among firms in the intermediate sector. The failures will restrict the size of 
the intermediate sector and affect the growth of the developing and middle-income 
countries. Thus, the government has a rationale for government intervention. With 
the presence of trade-off between the intermediate sector and the public s(H-tor, the 
paper tries to examine other coordination failures between the public soctor and 
the intermediate sector. The mismatch is an association of a developing economy 
with a developed country level of public input. The result of the coordination 
problem will lead to an equilibrium level of national income which is inferior to 
any other possible equilibria. The present study focuses on the potential role of 
government policy in picking up the more,desirable equilibrium. 
This study adopts a multiple equilibria, monopolistic competition and a general-
equilibrium framework to examine the role of government (public provision of in-
frastructure or industrial policy) in economic development. This study will first 
illustrates the multiple equilibria nature of the model. There are three equilibria 
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in the model. The first equilibrium describes an economy which is completely 
specialized in producing a capital intensive final goods with high technology. This 
final good is associated with a larger intermediate sector as well. The second 
equilibrium describes an economy which is completely specialized in producing a 
labor intensive final good with a lower level of technology. The third equilibrium 
describes an economy which is producing both goods. The study will illustrate 
that the first two equilibria are stable and the third one is unstable. Thus, the 
discussion concentrates more on the first two equilibria. 
In the model, the equilibrium of completely specialized in producing the high-
tech goods dominates the equilibrium of completely specialized in producing the 
low-tech goods according to the potential-Pareto criterion. Moreover, with the 
presence of the trade-off between the public sector and the intermediate sector, 
the role of public investment in promoting national income is indeterminate. It 
depends on the initial size of the public investment, the marginal productivity of 
the public input and the specification of the production function. 
With the above background, if the developing countries are associated with 
the public input level of the developed countries, this equilibrium will b(�inferior 
to any possible equilibria with an optimal level of public input in the model. As 
a result, the developing economy should be very careful and prudent in iiu;reasing 
public investment. 
The rest of this study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the existing lit-
eratures so as to bring out the contribution of this thesis. Chapter 3 pi(�st�iit,s the 
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basic assumptions and framework of the model. It also illustrates the possibility 
of multiple equilibria. Chapter 4 shows a comparative-statics analysis for under-
standing the effects of public inputs on the relative cost functions, and it provides 
some necessary background information for the welfare analysis. Chapter 5 shows 
the optimal level of public input for each complete specialization equilibrium and 




2.1 The Related Work in Literature of Development Economics 
Keynes(1936) in his pioneering book "General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
And Money" showed that an increase in government spending or fiscal policy 
will improve the welfare of a national. The argument dominated the intollectiial 
thinking for more than fifty years. 
Development Economists like Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurske and Kiiznets, under 
the influence of the Keyesian doctrine, believe that the state can play an important 
role in helping an economy and guide it away from its backwardness. 
Kuznets (1955) showed that the process of economic development was always 
associated with a shifting of labor force from low-productivity agricultm.(�to high 
productivity manufacturing. However, industrialization required a high saving rate 
and high rate of capital accumulation. 
Nurske (1953) developed the famous doctrine of the "vicious circle ofpoverty”. 
He pointed out that the poor societies remain poor because with lowei. capital 
income, they could not afford to have enough savings to increase their capital 
stock. 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) emphasized the demand side of the capital foi mat,ioii. 
The economies are underdeveloped because the market size for industrial products 
was small and people need to spend most of their income on necessities. He 
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I identified that the production process in modern industries were subject to great 
indivisibility and economies of scale. 
This line of analysis concludes that a developing country should establish a 
planning agency to formulate investments plans which provides rationale for gov-
ernment intervention. 
Knieger (1990) rethinks the role of government in the economic devdopment. 
Complementary to market failures, there may be government failures. He ques-
tioned the assumption of the government as a selfless, benevolent social guardian. 
Helpman (1976, 1977), showed that the Keyesian income multipliers (�ff(�(:t, may 
not be very significant. Furthermore, both unemployment, and imperfect compe-
tition can lead to a negative multiplier effect. Chao and Yu (1991,1993, 1996) 
studied the relationships among government spending, imperfect competition, un-
employment and variable return to scale. Hart (1982) and Mankiw (1987) studied 
that the effectiveness fiscal policy with imperfect competition. All of the ineiitioned 
studies confirmed that government spending has a positive relationship with the 
national income. This paper follows those wisdoms and continues to exairiiiie the 
role of government in economic development. 
The another stream of thought which is pioneered by Samiielson focuses on 
public good. One of the salient justification for government intervention is the 
presence for public goods. As we have already noted, the conventional wisdom 
agrees that infrastructure, which is usually considered as a public goods, should 
be provided by government. 
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Abe (1990) formally incorporated public input into a two sector general-equilibrium 
model and investigated the effect of government production to the pattern of trade. 
In this thesis, we follow the Abe (1990) theory to add the public input in the pro-
duction function explicitly. 
Barro (1990, 1992) developed a series of models to capture the essence of public 
inputs in a one sector, perfect competitive, and dynamic economy. To describe a 
developing or a middle-income country, it is more appropriate to adopt the two 
sector model. One of the sectors, which represents the manufacturing or high-
tech industry sector, uses intermediates more intensively. The other sector, which 
represents the agricultural or low-tech industry sector, uses intermediates much 
less intensively than the high-tech sector. 
2.2 The Related Work in Literature of Economics of Infrastructnre 
A series of literature estimated the social returns of government inpiit, espe-
cially infrastructure. Goltz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) constructed a formal model 
to show explicitly the effects of infrastructure on firms, markets, and equilibrium 
production level in each sector. Empirical findings support a positive effect of 
infrastructure on manufacturing outputs. This paper identifies two effects of in-
frastructure on the productivity of final goods. The first effect is that an increase 
in infrastructure will lower the fixed cost of the final goods. The second one is that 
an increase in infrastructure will increase the establishments in the intenriediates 
sector which will decrease the production cost of final goods. Empirical evdience 
suggests that the second effect is very significant but not the first effect. 
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Cain (1996) examines the link between US economic development and infras-
tructure investment. This study provides a historical perspective of the role of 
infrastructure in economic history. Moreover, it analyzed the role of public in-
vestment in infrastructure. It concludes, in the US railways history, the (efficiency 
of the best public investment in infrastructure can at most cover the opportunity 
cost. 
This study provides another story of the public provision of infrastructure. We 
will establish a negative relationship between the public sector (public provision of 
infrastructure) and the intermediate sector. In this relationship, we hope to bring 
out a deeper understanding of the issue. 
2.3 The Related Work in Literature of Increasing Returns to Scale and Multiple 
Equilibria 
The basic model of the thesis has some similarities to a number of w(�ll known 
paper advocating multiple equilibria in the presence of, division of labor, increasing 
returns to scale and monopolistic competition. As a result, we are going to examine 
the relationship between this thesis and the other paper. 
The idea that the division of labor can contribute to the productivity (,an be 
traced back to Adam Smith's famous dictum that division of labor is limited to 
\ the extent of the market. Allyn A. Young (1928) emphasized the progT(\ssive di-
vision and specialization of industries were essential parts of the process by which 
increasing return to scale is realized. His work pointed out the strong connec-
tion between the economies of specialization and the economies of the capitalistic 
( 
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methods of production. Alfred Marshall (1920) introduced the notion of external 
economies which dependent on the general progress of the economic environment. 
He stressed the importance of the supply of highly specialized intermediate inputs 
as a source of external effect. 
Following Marshall, Rochardson (1973), Stanback (1979), Porter(1990, 1992) 
and Krugman (1991) stressed the contribution of nontraded specialized producer 
service to the understanding of agglomeration economies and geographical. The 
idea was formalized by Either (1982) in the model of monopolistic competition. 
Either (1982) discussed the effect of scale economies resulting from an increased 
division of labor on the pattern of trade. 
The properties of increasing return to scale and monopolistic competition lead 
to the possibility of coordination failures of the market. In the framework of 
a small, open economy where there are positive external return in one sector, an 
increase in resources for the specific sector will lower its production cost. The Com-
plementaries implies the presence of the possibility of multiple equilibria. Graham 
(1923) first adopted technological externalities in one sector and then showed the 
possibility of the multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria. His model has been critidzed 
because of the vague nature of external economies. 
\ Matsuyama (1995) pointed out that technological externalities does not a nec-
essary attribute to the result of multiple equilibria. The incompleteness of markets 
can be the source of inefficiency and can result in multiple equilibria. When the 
products are Hicks-Allen complements, a whole set of complementary products 
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may still fail to be introduced even when it is more efficient to do so. The in-
troduction of the whole set of complementary products requires simultaneously 
cooperativ(3 behavior between each individual firm. When a large set of (comple-
mentary products are offered simultaneously and become available at a re>asonable 
price, the demand for the products becomes sufficient. The market efficiency arise 
in this thesis is a result of the incompleteness of markets but not technological 
externalities. 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) showed that there may be multiple equi-
libria even without the technological externalities. There are different sectors in 
the economy. Each sector can adopt either a simple constant return to scale tech-
nology or an increasing returns to scale technology. Complementaries may be 
present because when one sector adopts the increasing return to scale technology, 
it will increase the demand for the products of other sectors. It asserts that the 
underdevelopment equilibrium is simply a result of the lack of domestic demand. 
Ciccone and Matsiiyama (1993) showed the existence of multiple equilibria 
in a dynamic model that exhibits complementaries. The complementaries in their 
model arise because of a relatively high aggregate elasticity of substitution between 
labor and intermediate goods. But in this paper complementaries arise b()cause of 
the expansion of the sector that uses intermediates goods intensively. 
Okuno-Fujiwara (1988) examined the existence of multiple Pareto-rankable 
equilibria in a small, open economy with the presence of a non-tradable interme-
diate good. Okun-Fujiwara was concerned with the obstacles to the dev(�lopment, 
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of a particular sector of the economy. 
Venable (1996) allowed the intermediate goods to be tradable, and studied the 
effects of trade policy. This paper developed model with two industries. The down-
stream industry is perfectly competitive one and the upstream one is composed of 
endogenously determined number of Cournot oligopolist. Reducing the tariff on 
upstream production may lead the economy to a superior equilibria. In contrast, 
my thesis does not allow the intermediate input to be tradable. Moreover, the 
contribution of my thesis is to add the public input to the existing framework. 
Rodrik (1996), shows the existence of multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria in a 
model which is very similar to the one presented here. The concern of Riodrik's 
paper is on how the education level of the workforces determines whether there are 
multiple equilibria, and on how a high wage policy may help the economy select 
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. On the other hand, this thesis discusses the role 
of public input in the model and is interested in the mismatching probl(�m of the 
level of public input and development stages. 
The approach taken here has a close affinity to the recent work by Rodriguez-
Clare (1996a, 1996b). Rodriguez-Clare (1996a, 1996b) developed a general-equilibrium 
framework to address the attributes of such kind of inputs. As in th(�present 
paper, Rodriguez-Clare considers a model with two tradeable final goods and a 
non-tradable sector that produces intermediate good varieties under increasing re-
turns. Under the assumption that the two final goods differ in their intensity of 
use of intermediates, he shows the possibility of multiple specialization patterns. 
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Rodriguez-Clare's concerns are on identifying an "underdevelopment trap”, and on 
explaining why rates of return to capital may be equalized among countries with 
very different levels of development. This thesis enriches the model of Rodrigiiez-
Clare by considering the public sector explicitly. The present thesis k)cnses on 
the coordination between government production and the development stage and 




The Basic Model 
3.1 Basic Assumptions of the Model 
Consider a two factor, one intermediate input, one public input and two final 
goods small open economy. The two final goods are X and Y. The public input 
is, G, and the other intermediate input is z. The production of good X requires 
capital input, K, labor input, L, government input, G, and the>intermediate good 
,2：. The production of good Y requires capital input, iT,labor input, L, public 
input G and the intermediate good z. 
The two final goods , X and Y, can be traded freely in the world market which 
is perfectly competitive. The domestic market is relatively small and it cannot 
affect the world price. The prices of X and Y can be denoted respectively by Px 
and Py. All varieties z are assumed to be non-tradable. We will let p^(z) denote 
the price of variety i of intermediate good z. 
The intermediate good z are produced with a simple decreasing cost technology. 
We assume the production technology of the intermediate good requires oiily one 
unit, of capital as a fixed cost and labor input will be treated as a variable cost. 
Moreover, the public input is assumed to be freely provided by the government 
and will only require capital K. 
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3.2 Technology and Increasing: Returns to Scale 
Good X is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function which requires 
capital K, specialized inputs z and public input G as factor of production. The 
production function of good X 
X 二 K'xX L^/-'^D'i^^G^^ (3.1) 
where 
D x = i r z { i ) x d i y ^ ^ (3-2) 
Uo � 
The production function of the Good Y is: 
y 二 Kp^ L � � ' D i Y - ~ G � Y (3.3) 
where 
Dy= [ f ^ W i l " " (3.4) 
Uo J 
Both the values of 6 and f3 are between 0 and 1 for both good X and good F. 
The values of 0 are always larger than the values of a for both good X and good 
Y. The values of /3y is assumed to be larger than the values of 0x. The values of 
6^ is smaller than 6y.The composite intermediate good, D is assembled from a 
continuum of differentiated intermediate goods. The intermediate good is subject 
to monopolistic competition and the demand of good z follows the classic Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) preference. Due to the symmetric way in which different varieties of 
z enter in (3.2), and the convexity (1 > a > 0), efficiency requires firms producing 
final goods to use the same quantity of all available varieties. The amount of labor 
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devoted to the production of intermediate goods equals to Z = J; z{i)di = nz. 
Either (1982) pointed out two distinct sources of increasing returns to scale. The 
production function of each individual firm in the intermediate sector enjoy the 
traditional economies of scale which is a result of diminishing in average fixed 
cost. The another source of economies of scale comes from the division of labor. 
Economies of this sort depend upon the size of the market. Given the fixed level of 
n, the production function (3.2) displays a constant return to scale. When the n 
increases, the D rises in greater proportion than nz. Moreover, we can reinterpret 




where i == X, Y. 
The production functions for both good X and good Y exhibit an illcreasing 
returns to scale as a whole. Equation (3.5) shows that an increase in the nnmber 
of firm, which is a measnre of varieties available, will increase the total factor 
1 In a sYlnlnetric equilibrium all produced inputs would bear the same price and mallllfacturers 
of consumer goods would employ equal quantities z( i) = z of each. The (3.2) iUlplies that 
D = n,l/ex z. Regardless of its composition, the quantity of resources is needed to produce a 
bundle of differentiated inputs of a given size. As a result, Z = nz is used to lneasure the 
resources embodied in final goods. Then final output per unit of intermediate input is given by 
~ = n (1:"') . By substitution of this results to (3.1), the production function of good X can be 
written as (3.5). 
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productivity. In other words, given the same amounts of K, L, Z and G, more 
good X can be produced. 
Moreover, there is another source of increasing returns to scale whi< :h comes 
from the public sector. In present case, the economies of scale from public sector 
are external to both the firm and the industry. An increase in the supply of public 
input good in the present model can also be interpreted as an improvernent in 
technology or infrastructure. The production technology of the public good is: 
G == a + bKc (3.7) 
where 
a > 0, b > 0 
It is assumed that the public input requires capital as a factor of production. 
The technology is assumed to have a fixed capital input a, and a constant. marginal 
product of capital b. An increase in supply of public input can only achieve by a 
decrease in capital available to other sectors. The effect is similar to the inlposition 
of a lump sum tax to the economy. In the model , government faces the balance 
budget constraint. 
3.3 Market Equilibrium Conditions 
The factor market clearing condi bons are: 






As we have already mentioned, the production of intermediate good z requires 
an unit of capital, so the demand for capital of the z equals to the number of firm 
in the intermediate sector. 
The market equilibria should be defined as a measure of varieties produced n, 
an allocation of Land K among the production of X, Y, G and z. Moreover, the 
equili bri urn can be defined as a production level of each variety of z, a rental rate 
for capital r, a wage rate wand prices pz for each variety of z. 
The pz should fulfill the following conditions: 
i. pz maximizes profits from producing variety i of the intermedIate good; 
ii. given (n, r, w,pz),the inputs of specific final goods K, Land interrnediate 
goods z (if any) are determined to minimize the unit cost of producing final goods 
X and Y. 
iii. if both X and Y are produced, then the unit cost of both final goods will 
be equal to their price respectively. 
Px 
IV. zero profit condition in the production of intermediate goods. 
(3.11 ) 
(3.12) 
According to Helpman and Krugman(1985), for each variety, the price is just 
a constant markup over its marginal cost which is simply as wage rate over Q2: 
2 The structure of the production function (3.5) ilnplies the elasticity of substitution between 
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二 ^  (3.13) 
Pz a 
3.4 Relative Cost Functions 
After the minimization of the cost with respect to the factor prices, the unit 
cost functions of X and Y are : 
c'{n,r,p,) 二 a n - A / , ^ - � i — � i (3-14) 
~ ~ ^ " " " ‘ ‘ ‘ 
where 
a, = 6 � � f t _ W - ( ^ - W ( l _ / y - ( i — � " 
The demand functions for K, L and z for both goods can be obtained by simply 
partial differentiating the unit cost function with respect to the retum rate of a 
specific factor. 
. — d d [ n , r , w , p z ) 
c/三 Yf 
where f 二 r, w and p,, 
The capital labor ratio for good X: 
; ; ; ^ ^ ; ; ^ " ^ ; ; ^ ; ; ; ; ; ; 5 ^ ; ^ ^ ^ i ; 7 r ^ T l , and a spending an amount E maximizes the production 
by purchasing: — 柳 广 
'⑴ 二 l^WW^ 
界 ¥ 二 二 = = 二 for : � . F a c i n , the d e _ d f u n c t i o n , . - — 
will maximize the profits: 
7r(i) 二 p(iMi) — ^z{i) 一 r 
The equilibrium price is: ^ 
p =— a 
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where 
As we have already assumed, {3y > (3x and 8x > 8y , the value of cPy should be 
. larger than cP x. The labor capital ratio for both good X and good Y is independent 
of the supply of public good. With a given level of public good, total use of labor 
for per unit of capital for the good Y is larger than good X. It is consist.(~nt with 
our assumption that the good X is a high-technology good and good Y is a low-
technology goods. The government in the model cannot affect the production 
technology. 
The factor market clearing condition: 
( r)( Kx ) ~ (r)( K y )_ L cPx - + \flY -
w K - Kc - n w K - Kc - n K - Kc - n (3.17) 
The eqnation is just a reinterpretation of the original factor market equilibrium 
conditions (3.8), (3.9) and(3.10). 
To have a deeper insight from the model, we first must characterize equilibrium 
when nand G are taken as given. It is also useful to first find the unit, cost of 
X relative to Y when the economy is completely specialized in either good X or 
good Y for a given of nand G. The relat.ive cost function helps to investigate the 
change of the production cost of good X relative to good Y. We will note that it 
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also helps us to define the equilibria in this model. 
The relative cost functions are : 
Y 
p^{G^K,n) = ^ ( 3 . 1 8 ) 
M G ’ K , n � 二 a ~ - � - - # ( 告 ) ( � ' ' ^ ― (3.19) 
The px describes the relative cost of an economy which is complet,(�special-
ization in X. The py describes the relative cost of an economy which is complete 
spedalizat,ioii in Y. 
After the substitution of equation (3.17) into (3.19), we have: 
P . ( C . K , n ) = < A - � - � ( 3 ) ( ^ > ^ f — V -
Proposition 1 For any given level of G and K, the relative cost function is an 
nwerted U-shaped curve. Given 0y is larger than 0x, the py{G, K, n) unll be. larger 
than px{G^K,n), the relative cost function is higher when there is a complete 
specialization in production of good Y and vice versa. 
In Figure 1, we can see that the p, are inverted U-shaped and py is higher 
than px- This is a standard result in RodrigTiez-Clare(1996) that the P,�G,K, n) 
is an inverted U-shaped (.,urve and can be decomposed into two effects. The first 
one is the neoclassical effect and the second one is the love of varieties effect. Since 
K and G are fixed, as n increases, there are two opposite effects on th(�relative 
cost, functions. The first effect is that aii increase in n implies a decreas(^ in the 
capital stock {K - Kc 一 n) available to the production of final goods. It implies 
an increase in the production cost of the good which is capital int,ensiw. On the 
28 
contrary, an increase in n will decrease the production cost of good X. For a lower 
value of n, a high quantity of capital is left for the production of final goods and 
so the love of variety effect dominates. Therefore, pi{-) is upward sloping when 
the capital for producing final good is still vast. If the value of n is sufficiently 
large and close to K, most of the capital stock will be devoted to the production 
of intermediate goods and there will be little left for production of final goods. As 
a consequence, the neoclassical effects dominates and p,(.) slopes downward. 
We are now going to characterize the general equilibria for the economy. A 
3 
zero profit condition should be imposed to industry z : 
^ \ ( ^ \ ^ J ^ - r (3.20) 
LVa； 」n , 
Put the above condition into the profit function of intermediate goods z : 
沉 二 [(二、一 ^1 ^xKx+lvKy — ^ (3.21) 
L W J “‘ 
where 
= … - 如 (3.22) 
‘ 氏 
When the economy is completely specialized in producing goodX, tlie capital 
market equilibrium becomes 
Ki = K - Kc - n (3.23) 
The porfit function for complete specialization equilibrium is: 
^ 二 R ! ^ � — J lAK-n-Kc) - T (3.24) 
[\aJ n 
. r r, f . 1 ^ - Z, dC'/dp,^  _ g(l-/3..) 
3 The demand for Z per unit of K of industry i ： j^ = ac"ar — 6, 
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The zero profit condition is 7r = 0. We get the equilibrium number of firm n*^  
when the economy is completely specialized in producing X, 
n ^ 二 ixK-Kc (3-25) 
7 x ( l - o Q 
w h e r e “ = l + 7 x ( l - a ) 
It is simple to derive riy : 
n*y = ivK - Kc (3.26) 
7 y ( l - ^ ) 
w h — Y = D “ 1 _ � ) 
The assTimption of 1 > a > 0 implies that the equilibrium number offirms (np, n*j^ ) 
in the intermediate sector should be positive. By the assumptions of /3y > Px and 
S^ > 6y, ^Y can be larger or smaller than Oc It implies that the number of firms in 
the intermediate sector of complete specialization in X can be larger and smaller 
than complete specialization in Y for a given level of public input. 
On the demand side, when there is complete specialization in good X, the 
demand for intermediate input will increase. The 0y > 0x assumption implies that 
the demand for z is higher for industry X than industry Y. As a result, complete 
specialization in good X will increase profits of the firms in the intermediate sector. 
It implies that the equilibrium number of firms in the intermediate sect,or will 
increase. 
On the supply side, due to the assumption that the bx > ^y,，the complete 
specialization in good X will lead to a greater demand in capital than an economy 
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which is specialized in good Y. Therefore, the rental rate of capital will increase� 
The fixed cost of producing z will increase, and thus undermining profits of firms 
in the intermediate sector, n^ will be larger or smaller than n \ , depending on 
which effect dominates. The interaction of the two effects decide the equilibrium 
number of firms in the intermediate sector for complete specialization in good X 
and complete specialization in good Y. 
In this study, we will investigate the effect of government expenditure on the 
division of labor, so we assume that the effect of py > Px is larger than the effect 
of 6x > ^Y- In other words, we are more interested on the demand side rather than 
that of the supply side effect of the intermediate sector. It is because in the supply 
side, we will add another attribute to the model. The public sector will become a 
competitor to the intermediate sector for the capital. This relationship will be the 
most salient property of the model. In order to give a clearer picture of the public 
sector, we decide to underweight the effect of the supply side effect in here. It can 
be stated as: 
6c > ^y (3-27) 
The assumption ensures that n*x > np for a given level of public inputs. 
One salient property of the equilibrium number of firms is the fact that it is 
a decreasing function in Kc- It implies that an increase in government spending 
will decrease the number of firms in the market of intermediate goods. In other 
words, as in a simple Keynesian framework, the government production will crowd 
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out resources for the private sector. It is assumed that the public input, requires 
only the capital as its factor of production. Therefore, an increase in government 
production will increase both the demand for capital and rental rate. It implies 
that the fixed cost for producing good z will increase and the number of firm will 
decrease in both equilibria for complete specialization in good X and good Y. 
As nx is larger than ny, it is possible to have multiple equilibria. We assume 
for some reasons that the economy first specializes in producing good X . As the 
demand for intermediate goods is relatively high, a large variety of intermediate 
goods will be produced. Thus, the cost of producing the final good X will be 
even lower in this case, rendering the economy to have no tendency to change 
its production pattern and stick to producing good X. The other equilibrium, of 
course, is the complete specialization in the production of good ^ . Th(�s tory is 
exactly the same as what we have illustrated for the equilibrium X. It is possible 
for the third equilibrium to be in existence when the economy is producing both 
good X and good Y. nx — ny, should be large enough for the existence of multiple 
equilibria. According to Rodriguez-Clare, there is a unique equilibrium when: 
p¢[pY{nY{G),G),Px{nx{G),G)] (3.28) 
The unique equilibrium is either complete specialization in good X or good Y. 






It is assumed that for a given level of G, nx—ny is large enough that py(ny(C),G) < 
px{nx{G),G). Alternatively, the equilibria can be stated as: 
i. If p is greater than or equal to zero, there is complete specialization in Y 
and we call it equilibrium Y. 
ii. If p is greater than or equal to px{'). then there is complete specialization 
in X and we call it equilibrium X. 
iii. If px{-) > P > pY(.), then there is a production of both X and Y and we 
call it diversified equilibrium. 
The two complete specialization equilibria, equilibrium X and equilibrium Y, 
are stable. The diversified equilibrium, however, is not stable. Formally, for a 
given level of public input the diversified equilibrium will exist : 
n : e [nx{KG:G,p),ny(KGG,p)] (3.30) 
n* is the equilibrium number of firms in the intermediate sector of the diversified 
equilibrium. It can be shown that for a given level of government production, 
profits in the intermediate sector are increases with n^. This implies that 'with 
Marshallian dynamics' where entrepreneurs slowly enter the intermediate good 
sector if there are positive profits and vice versa. It implies that the equilibrium 
with n 二 nl is unstable. A slight perturbation in n would push the economy to one 
of the equilibria with complete specialization. The formal proof of the existence of 
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the equilibrium can be found in Rodriguez-Clare (1996a). 
In this chapter, we describe a model which can capture the public inpiit，in-
termediate inputs, high technology and low technology final goods under the mo-
nopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale framework. This model 
establishes a relationship between the public sector and the intermediate sector. 
It is different from the traditional approach because the public sector does not 
only affect the resources available for producing final goods but also intermediate 
goods. As a result, the productivity of the intermediate input is affectec' by the 
level of public input,. 
Owing to the nature of multiple equilibria, this model is able to describe the 
different stages of economic development and the optimal level of publi(, input 
at different stages of economic development. The equilibrium X, in which the 
economy is completely specialized in producing good X, can be perceived as the 
economy at a developed stage. It is because good X is capital intensive and has 
a high degree of division of labor in the intermediate sector. On the other hand, 
the equilibrium 7, in which the economy is complete specialization in good F, can 
be interpreted the economy at a developing stage. It is because good 7 is in an 
industry which is labor intensive and has a lower degree of division of labor in the 
intermediate sector. 
CHAPTER 4 
Production Cost and Government Policy 
4.1 Relative Cost Function and the Selection of Equilibrium 
In Chapter 3, we use the relative cost function to define the equilibrium of the 
model. We can predict that a change in the value of the relative cost function will 
change the equilibrium. We also know that the public input will affect the value 
of relative cost function. We can thus deduce that a change in the level of public 
input will change the equilibrium condition. 
As we have already mentioned, the model describes a small and open economy, 
so we can regard the world price as given and assume that the economy cannot 
change the world price. Given a fixed world price, the only factor that affect 
the production pattern of the economy is the relative production cost. If the 
production cost of good X increases but the production cost of good Y does not 
change, we can expect more good Y will be produced. Moreover, whether the 
economy decides to concentrate their production on either good X or good Y will 
depend on the value of relative cost function. Of course, an economy can diversify 
their production to both good X and good Y. The decision, again, is based on the 
value of the relative cost function. 
Moreover, it will be shown that the level of public input affects both the pro-
duction of final goods and intermediate input. The effect of government policy 
becomes subtle because of the presence of the trade-off between the public sector 
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and the intermediate sector. The difference in factor intensity makes the problem 
becomes more sophisticating. Therefore, we need to give a more careful examina-
tion to the relationship between public input and production cost. 
As we have mentioned, the relative cost function is defined as: 
p“G,n) = J (4.1) 
C^  
Substitute (3.25),(3.26) and (3.7) into the relative cost function. The relative 
cost functions of complete specialization in X and complete specialization in Y 
are: 
( Q _ Q^\^X-^Y (Q^x\ 
Px(G,n*) ^ a ~ - � ( e x i ^ — ^ ) <i>x { - ) 
i^( l - i x ) ^ y QOy-Ox 丨 (4.2) 
L 
^ ^ ( G - a � ^ i Y (ax\ 
MG,rn = a~-々x [^y^ — 丁) # [-) 
K(1 - ^y) X y QCTY-<rx (4.3) 
L 
Both the relative cost functions for equilibrium X and equilibrium V^  become 
a function of G. Therefore, the effect of public input on production cost can be 
calculated by simply differentiating the relative cost function with respect to the 
G. In other words, we can investigate the effect of an increase in the supply of 
public goods on the values of relative cost functions. By the same token, if an 
increase in the supply of public goods causes the production cost of goods Y 
increases relatively to the production cost of goods X, the values of the relative 
cost function will increase, and vice versa. The values of the relative cost functions 
is important because it will affect the equilibrium for an economy. 
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Rodrik (1996) suggested that the government should adopt a minimum wage or 
investment subsidy plan to push the economy from a bad equilibrium (low output 
level and low income) to a good equilibrium (high output level and low income). 
Both the minimum wage and investment subsidy plan aimed at increasing the cost 
of production for the low technology good, relative to the high technology good. 
In this stiidy, the orientation of the policy changes from that of minimum wage 
and investment subsidy to an increase in the supply of public goods. 
We can observe that, if there is an increase in the value of the relative cost 
function ( | g > 0), the region for a unique equilibrium which has a complete 
specialization in good X will increase. The region for unique equilibrium, which 
is completely specialized in producing good Y, will be smaller. The region for 
multiple equilibria, however, is indeterminate. It depends on the effect of public 
input on the relative cost function of complete specialization in good X and Y. In 
d(^) 
other words, it depends on the ratio of ^ ^ ) . However, it is difficulty to gct a clear 
和 ） 
picture of 力 ) , s o we would concentrate on the unique equilibrium. Moreover, 
it would have adequate welfare implication for this limited consideration. 
On the； contrary, if there is a decrease in the value of relative cost function 
( ¾ < 0), the region for a unique equilibrium which is complete specialization 
in good X will be smaller. The region for unique equilibrium, which is complete 
specialization in good Y, will be larger. The region for multiple equilibria, again, 
is indeterminate. 
As a result, one of the salient concerns for the study is whether an increase in 
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the supply of public goods will increase the value of the relative cost function. The 
effect of an increase in the supply of public input on the relative cost functions 
of X and Y are : 
^ " X , 1 ⑶ ( 〒 广 〜 ( - - - ) [ 队 - ( 甲 ) 广 " ' � — ( U ) 
犯 ― 一 ‘ 么 ⑶ ( ^ ^ 广 〜 [ 队 — ( 罕 ) 广 - 如 - 1 G — 呼 
二 一 - - 入 “ 告 ) ( ^ ^ 广 ] 队 — ( 明 广 外 — 1 ^ _ _ 1 (i.�>) 
— { ( - v - - x ) [ & K - ( ^ ) ] - ^ ^ ^ j 
where i = X, V 
It is clear from equation (4.5) that: 
\dp^{G)] J. ^ .l,r^ (G-^\] i^x-^y)G] 
sgn : = sgn ^ ( a y - a x ) 队 — （ ^ ~ " ^ 」 ~ ^ J ( 叫 
After collecting terms, (4.6) can be decomposed into three terms: 
'{(JY-(Tx){b^^K^-a)^ + r (cTx-^y)1 ^ _ [ ( 作 - 叫 g (4.7) 
b b b ‘ 
一 J L J 匕 ^ 
If the summation of the above equation is positive,籍 > 0, and vice versa. 
Recall the definition of (pi, 
, ^ � / 1 - a\ 
1 - 伐 了 V OL / 
The values of /3y is assumed to be larger than 0x, so the values of (px 's larger 
than ifY and therefore (v?x — ^v) must be positive. It implies that if rr^ = oy, 
any increase in public input will cause a decrease in the value of the relative cost 
function. The value of ox equals to the value of oy means the fraction of the public 
input in the production function of both good X and good Y is the same. In other 
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words, the direct contribution of the public input to the factor productivity for both 
good X and good Y should be the same. However, as we have already mentioned, 
the increase in public input will decrease the capital available to both final good 
X and good V. The intermediate input z contributes more to the production of X 
than the production of good Y. As a result, a decrease in the number of firms in 
the intermediate sector will increase the cost of production in X relative to Y. In 
this case, the value of relative cost function will decrease. 
Proposition 2 Given ax = cry, an increase in the supply of puhlic input will 
decrease the relative cost functions for both complete specialization in good X and 
good Y. In this case, no government policy can decrease the production cost of good 
X relative to good Y. In other words, government policy cannot increase the region 
for an umque equilibrium of complete specialization in X and decrease the region 
for an umque eqmUbnum of complete specialization in Y. 
. It is only a special case and has little or no application and generalization in 
the real world. But we are interested in a more general case which the value of ax 
is different from the value of ay. 
There are two cases to consider, the first case is that the value of ax is larger 
than the value of riy. The first bracket [ ( " " � 御 ) ] i s negative, the second 
bracket is [ ( � � ' ' ) � ] p o s i t i v e and last bracket [ ( 权 - 广 ) ’ is always negative. The 
only possibility for the value of the relative cost function to increase is: 
' {cTx-^Y)G^� \ {cTY-^x){b^^K + a)^ + U ^ x - ^ Y ) G ^ (4.8) 
b [ b J [ b J 
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However, this possibility does not exist. It is because we have: 
「 /^G — a\^ 
{<Ty - c T x ) 队 - H H (4.9) 
L V 0 乂」 
= { c T Y - c r x ) n i (4.10) 
The value of n must be positive, so (oy — crx)叫 must be negative. The con-
dition implies that the absolute value of ( ^乂 -广 )。 i s smaller than or equal to 
-{ay-axmK+a)^ j^ implies that the inequality (4.8) never holds. 
Proposition 3 Given ax > ^y, an increase in the supply of public input will 
decrease the value of the relative cost function. The result of an increase in the 
supply of public input is exactly the same as the case ofax : cry-
If the value of ay is larger than ax, the first bracket [ ( ” - 、 ( 办 糾 仅 ) ] w i l l 
be positive, the second bracket, will be (口广广)。n e g a t i v e and last bracket 
{^x-^v)G will always be negative. The only possibility for derivative of the 
relative cost function to be positive is: 
'(cTy - ax)�KiK + g)1 l(cTx - cTy) G + {(fx 一 y^ vQ G^ 
- J � [ 6 J ( ) 
If the absolute value of the first bracket {^y-^x)(b^iK+a) -^  iarger than the absolute 
value of the second bracket (^x-t^y)c+(v^x-^y)G',肌 increase in the supply of 
public goods will increase the value of the relative cost function. As we have already 
mentioned, the absolute value of p^v-^xKbC./^+a)j jg iarger than [(。广;、.乂~^] . The 
condition for (oy — ax)rii to be negative does not rule out the possibility. We 
have the following proposition: 
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Proposition 4 Given ay > ^x and |(即—")产尺+~| > 丨(…^)。，…)。! , an 
increase for the supply of public input will increase the value of relative cost, and 
vice versa. 
Intuitively, the term i^x-^v)G represents the difference between the direct 
productivity effect on good X and good Y. An increase in the supply of public 
input will lower the cost of production for both good X and good Y. The concern 
is that whether the increase in productivity of good X will be larger or smaller than 
Y. Therefore, the term (口^—广)。provides a means to measure the effe(,t. The 
value of a is a measurement of the public input contribution to the production of 
good X and good Y. The multiplication of j of {ax — cry) irriplies that the larger 
the initial value of G, the larger the effect will be. 
The term — {(fx — (pv) j represents the negative relationship between the pub-
lic sector and the intermediate sector. In Goltz-Eakin and Lovely (1996), they 
emphasize the positive contribution of the public sector to the intermediate sector. 
In their model, the increase in the supply of public input will increase the number 
of establishments in the intermediate sector. On the contrary, in this study, we 
emphasize the negative effect of the public sector on the intermediate sector. As 
a result, we establish a negative relationship between the public sector and the 
intermediate sector. It is because the production of public input uses the capital. 
The increase in the supply of public input will decrease the availability of capital 
and increase the rental price. The production of intermediate input also requires 
capital. As a result, the production cost of intermediate input will increase and 
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the number of firms in the intermediate sector will decrease. The intermediate 
sector is subject to the increasing returns to scale, which means that the marginal 
product z will increase as the number of firms in the intermediate sector increase. 
The decrease in the number of firms in the intermediate sector will increase the 
production cost of the both final goods. 
Again, the question is whether will the increase in the production cost, of good 
X be larger or smaller than good Y. The expression - [(fx — V y^) provides a means 
to measure of the effect. The minus sign represents that the effect that is negative 
to productivity. The multiplication of j of {(fx _ ^v ) implies that the larger the 
initial value of G, the larger the effect will be. Also, if the marginal productivity 
of capital in the production of public input b is larger, the negative effect of the 
public input to the production of good X and good Y will be smaller. 
The production of both good X and good Y use capital K, the primary factor, 
as a factor of production. As a result, an increase in rental price will increase the 
production cost for both good X and good Y. The increase in the supply of public 
input means an increase in the demand for capital by the public sector. It will 
increase the rental price r and the production cost for both good X and good Y. 
The term ( 即 - " ) 严 ^ + 4 represents that an increase in public input will increase 
the rental price, and therefore increase the production cost of both final good X 
and good Y. An increase in fixed cost a for producing public input implies an 
larger demand for capital when the supply of public input increases. Also, the 
larger the valiie of b, which is the marginal product of capital in the production of 
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public input, the less negative the effect will be. Recall the equations (3.25) and 
(3.26): 
认 = n — Kc 
It implies that the smaller the difference between the capital use in the pro-
duction of the intermediate sector and the public sector, the smaller the effect will 
be. 
The interaction among these three effects decide the sign of 如盆 ) . T h e s e 
three effects determine whether the supply of public input can increase the region 
for the unique equilibrium of complete specialization in producing of good X and 
decrease the region for unique equilibrium of complete specialization in producing 
of good Y. A necessary but not sufficient condition for government policy to work 
is that the fact that value of ay must be larger than that of ox • It implies that the 
contribution of public sector should be larger in good Y relative to good X. We 
can note that the effect of [ ( 。 广 。 〒 灿 ) ] a n d [i^2cpdGj ^orks in an opposite 
direction. l{<'y-^x)mK+a)l^ , however, is always larger than | ( " : 吓 ) 。 . 
This chapter provides a formal examination of the conventional wisdorn that 
government policy can help the economy to find a high technology equilibrium. It 
partially confirms the results of Rodrik (1996) and Goltz-Eakin and Lovely (1996). 
Moreover, their study identifies a necessary condition for government to intervene. 
The condition is cTy > (Jx- It is also clear that government intervention can be 
effective. 
At the same time, their study also points out some possibilities that government 
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policy can have a completely different impact on the production cost of good V and 
good X. It can increase or decrease the production cost of good Y relative to good 
X. It implies that an increase in the supply of public input does not necessarily 
imply that more good X will be produced. 
Most importantly, we need to note that the initial level of public input (gov-
ernment size) affects the effectiveness of government policy. For a big government, 
it is unlikely that an increase in the level of public input (further increase in the 
size of public sector) will increase the relative cost of good Y relative to good X 
thus achieving the high technology equilibrium X. On the contrary, if there is a 
small government, the possibility for government policy to help the economy to 
find the X equilibrium will increase. 
CHAPTER 5 
Government Policy and National Income 
5.1 Optimal Level of Public Input 
The aims of the study is to identify the impact of government policy on national 
income. The first question we will address in this chapter is the optimal level of 
public input in different equilibria. We will also compare the national income 
functions when there is a complete specialization in good X and good Y. It is the 
most salient concern in this study because the analysis of chapter four is meaningful 
if, and only if, we can give a ranking between the equilibrium X and equilibrium 
Y. Moreover, we will point out an interesting case in which government policy may 
seriously undermine the welfare of an economy. 
The national income function is: wage and rental payment can be written as: 
U = WiL + riK (5.1) 
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The wage and rental payment functions^ can be written as: 
w, = B,0,n{GV'L-^' [K{l — <Ji)f G^^  (5.2) 
r, = B ,n (GO^L" ' : [K (1 - <eO]" G � (5.3) 
where 
. P # i — � ? — i 
^i = 
a^ 
where i = X, Y. 
Wage rate and rental rate are functions of public input G and the number of 
firms in the intermediate sector z. The level of public input affects the wage and 
rental rate through two channels. The first channel is the public input that direct 
contribution of public input the production of final goods directly. However, there 
exists a negative relationship between the number of firms n in the intermediate 
sector and the level of public input, G. It will undermine the productivity of n in 
the production of good X and good Y. 
Then, we can substitute the wage rate function (5.2) and the rental rate func-
tion (5.3) into the national income function (5.1): 
u = B,c|),n^^L'-'^ [K — Kc — n.f U + Bin^L" [K — Kc — n ^ f ' ' ' K (5.4) 
1 The ratio of the labor demand for intermediate goods to the labor demand for final goods 
is; 
"么 _ §£^ ! dCj 一 g(i-A:) L： 一 ^ / ~d^  — f3i -6, 
We know that Li + Zi = L, therefore we have: 
r. 一 i(^r-6.)L 
Li — /3,>, 
After we subsititing the above equation into production and differentiating the production 
function with respect to L, we have the wage function: 
Wi = 5,0,n(Gr'L-"^' [K{1 — ^,)1^' G。 
where 
氏 二 ^ ^ ^ 
A similar method is used to derive the rental function: 
n = BMCTTLW [K (1 - <eO]''-i G�i 
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After the substitution of (3.25) and (3.26), the equilibria condition of the industry 
z, into the national income function, the above expression can be simplified as: 
- / 广 _ o \ n ^i � K ‘ 
U 二 ^ irK — - ^ L\-' [K{l — i^^G^^ ¢. + ^ ^ - - (5.5) 
L V 0 )\ [ K{l - Q)_ 
The national income becomes a function of G only. It can be further simplified as: 
r /广—n \ 1外 
h = A irK - [ - ^ ) G^. (5.6) 
where 
A = B,L]-' 0 〜 二 0 [K{l-m'' 
The effect of a change on the supply of public input on the national income 
function is 語. 
尝 = - 字 — - ( 罕 ) 广 〜 — 队 - ( 閉 广 。 - ' ( 5 . 7 ) 
By collection terms and plugging equation (3.25) and (3.26) to the above equa-
tion, we can further simplify the expression into: 
^T 「 广1 
S = ^ G ^ - i n ^ ' - i n^ 一 ^,- (5.8) 
dG L 0 � 
As constant A must be positive, the level of public input must be positive as well. 
Again, the number of firms in the sector z, is positive. Therefore, the concern lies 
on the term in the bracket |cr,:ni — (fiijY As a result, we can have the sufficient 
condition for government policy to increase national income: 
G , � 
UiCTi > ifi— (5.9) 
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On the other hand, we have a similar sufficient condition for government policy 
to decrease the national income: 
Q 
riiCT, < i f r z (5.10) 
0 
We have the following proposition: 
Proposition 5 An increase in the supply ofpublic input will increase the national 
income if the n^ai > ( f i j , and vice versa. 
This proposition captures the essence of traditional government faihire. How-
ever, the interpretation is completely different in the model. As we can note, the 
increase in the share of government input in the production function will lead to 
an increase in the possibility of positive government expansion of national income. 
The reason is that when a government increases its production, the cost of good X 
will decrease. Thus, with the same budget, the economy can produce more goods. 
However, since an increase in government production will extract capital from the 
private sector which leads to an increase in fixed cost by establishing a firm in 
industry z, it implies that less firms can survive in the industry and therefore 
industry z becomes less competitive. 
We believe that the division of labor will enhance efficiency, a smaller number 
of firms in the intermediate sector implies a smaller degree of division of labor, a 
decrease in the productivity of the intermediate sector and as decrease iii national 
income. The existing level of government production becomes an indicator. As we 
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can note in the above equation, the larger the existing government production, the 
larger the negative effect it has on national income. 
The next question what is the optimal level of public input when the economy 
has a completely specialized in good X and good Y. Recall the equation (5.7): 
^ = - ^ [ � ( v r � � 4 M ¥ ) r w 
The first order condition is : 
^ = 0 
dG 
命 ( 罕 ) ] 〜 （ , [ 叫 宁 ) 广 > 
G： = — (5.11) 
^1 , 
a,{hi,K + a) 
= — ( ~ ~ ； ^ " r ~ (5.12) 
m + cr,) 
The second order condition is in Appendix A. The optimal level of public input G* 
is an increasing function of b, n and a” Moreover, we would like to know whether 
the value of G*x is larger or smaller than the value of Gy- As we hav(�already 
noted, the value of nx is larger than ny. Therefore, the sufficient condition for G*x 
larger than Gy is： 
^ > ^ (5.13) 
^X ^Y 
However, we know that the value of ipx is larger than ypy. As a resiilt, the 
necessary condition for (5.13) to hold is that the value of cTx should be larger than 
f^ y. 
We have the following proposition: 
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Proposition 6 The optimal level of public input in equilibrium X {G*x) will be 
larger than equilibrium Y {Gy) if the ratio ofax to (px is larger than the ratio of 
cry to (fY ‘ 
The equation (5.13) is based on the relationship between the intermediate 
sector and the public sector. In this model, there exists a negative relationship 
between the size of the intermediate sector and the public sector. We also know 
that an expansion of the public sector will contribute to the production of final 
goods but decrease the size of the intermediate sector. In turn, a smaller interme-
diate sector renders the intermediate inputs less productive, cr^  is a measurement 
of the direct contribution of G and (f^  is a measurement of the effect of a smaller 
intermediate sector. 
However, we know that the value of (fx is larger than (fy- As a result, the 
necessary condition for (5.13) to hold is that the value of ax should be larger than 
ay. The equation (5.13) is not a necessary condition because rix is larger than ny. 
Therefore, if we know that Gy is larger than cTx ,we still cannot conclude that G*x 
is smaller than Gy. 
The result is also consistent with the believe that a large fraction of public 
input in production implies a large value of optimal level of public input ,and vice 
versa. Moreover, a larger contribution of the intermediate input to the production 
of final goods should be associated with a lower optimal level of public input. 
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5.2 The Ranking of Equilibria 
In this model, we have three equilibria. Up to now, we have not yet discussed 
the welfare implication of these equilibria. In this section, we will first address the 
welfare implication of equilibrium X and equilibrium Y. For a given level of public 
input G, we hope to rank of equilibrium X and equilibrium Y. The sec;ond point 
we want to address is that we will try rank equilibrium X and equilibrium Y when 
the level of public input G*is optimal. 
In Chapter 4, we stated the relationship between level of public input and 
the relative production costs of good X and good Y. It also suggested the condi-
tion for government policy to change the equilibrium. However, the discussion is 
meaningful only when we know the welfare implication of different equilibrium. 
Rodrik (1996) adopted the unit cost graphical approach to show that the equi-
librium of complete specialization in high technology goods dominates the equilib-
rium of complete specialization in low technology goods. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) 
contends the similar model with this studies. He shows that the equilibrium of 
complete specialization in capital intensive goods is Pareto Dominate th(�equilib-
rium of complete specialization in labor intensive goods. 
In the last section, we found the optimal level G*. It is because the public 
input is provided freely by the government. Producers will choose their production 
decisions for an exogenous level of public input. We then substitute the optimal 
level of public input G*x into the nation income function. The national income 
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function of complete specialization in X for an optimal level of G*x is： 
(hr)axV^ 
Ix{n.G^) = ^ x n ^ ( ^ ) ' " = A x u ^ ~ ^ (5.14) 
\ 竹 
The national income function of complete specialization in Y for an optimal level 
of G*x is 
/ h \ ^^ 
ly{n,G^) = Ayn^^G^^ = AyK^ - ^ (5.15) 
V 似 ) 
The national income function of complete specialization in X for an optimal level 
of Gy is: 
fbnax^V^ 
Ix(n,G*y) = ^ x ^ r ( 叫 ‘ ' = ^ x n ^ � (5.16) 
V ^y 
The national income function of complete specialization in Y for an optimal level 
of Gy is： 
Iy{n,G*y) 二 Aynp' ( G � = A y K ^ ( 苦 ) ^ (5.17) 
In this study, welfare means the national income. We adopts national in-
come as a means to measure of welfare. The question then becomes the values of 
Ix [(n(G3c)' ^x)] is larger or smaller than Iy [n{Gx), G*x]. We know that the value 
of n f is larger than the value of Uy^. The remaining two questions are the valiies 
of ai and the values of Ai. In Appendix B, we will show that the Ax is larger than 
Ay. As a result, we have the following proposition: 
Proposition 7 The national income function of equilibrium X is large?- than equi-
librium Y for a given optimal level of public input G\ : 
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Ix [(r^^x(G*),G*)] > h K(C*) ,G*] (5.18) 
if the value of ax is larger than the value of oy. 
It is a sufficient but not a necessary condition because when the value of cjx is 
smaller than the value of oy. And, there still has a possibility that Ix [(nx(C*), G*) 
is larger than Iy [n[G*),G*]. It is because the Axn^x is always larger than Aynp^. 
The proposition is consistent with our observations in the real world. The coun-
tries, which specialize in producing high technology goods with a large intermediate 
sector, will have a higher level of income than the countries, which specialize in 
producing low technology goods with a large intermediate sector. 
But now, we still cannot compare the welfare between equilibrium X with op-
timal level of public input G*x and equilibrium Y with optimal level of public input 
Gy. The comparison is important because it helps us to know whether government 
policy can change the welfare ranking of the equilibria. 
Although we cannot compare Ix [(^^'x{G*x),G*x] and Iy [ny(G^y),Gy] directly, 
we know that in equilibrium X, the value of G*x maximizes the value of national 
income function. It implies that with level of public input other than G*x, the 
national income must be lower the national income function with G*x- We can 
write it explicitly as : 
Ix [ ( n x ( Q ^ � I x [nx{G), G] for all G + G\ (5.19) 
The same reasoning can be applied to the equilibrium Y as well. We have:, 
ly [(nY{Gy),G*y] > Iy M G ) , G ] for all G + G\ (5.20) 
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One important application for the result of (5.19) is to use it as a bridge to compare 
the Ix [{^'x{G*x),Gx] and Iy [ny(Gy),Gy]. If we substitute the equation Gy into 
Ix, we will have: 
. ‘ Ix[{nx{G^y)^Gl.] (5.21) 
According to equation (5.19), we have the following inequality: 
Ix [{nx{G^), G^] > Ix [ K ( G ^ ) , ^M (5.22) 
The most interesting case is when we apply proposition 7, we will have the following 
ranking: 
Ix [ (nx(Gi ) ,Gi ] > Ix [{nx{G*y),G*y] > Iy [ny{G*y),G*y] (5.23) 
Therefore, we have the following proposition: 
Proposition 8 Given the results of proposition 1 and equation (5.19), even if 
the public input level is being optimized m both equilibrium X and equilibrium Y, 
the equilibrium X dominates the equilibrium Y according to the potential-Pareto 
criterion, which means: Ix [{^'x{G*x),G*x] > Iy [ny(Gy), Gy 
The proposition implies that the level of public input cannot change the welfare 
ranking of equilibrium X and equilibrium Y. But government policy may change 
the economy from one equilibrium to another. However, it is not possible for 
government to change the ranking of different equilibria. Yet, it does not imply that 
government policy contributes nothing to the selection of equilibrium or economic 
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development. It only implies that the ranking between different equilibria cannot 
be changed by government policy. However, government can still help the ec;onomy 
to pick up a more desirable equilibrium by changing the relative production cost 
between good X and good Y. 
5.3 The Mismatch 
This section will discuss a special case. The government does not know whether 
its economy is in equilibrium X or in equilibrium Y. Yet, the government can choose 
to optimize the national income of either equilibrium X or equilibrium F, however, 
As a result, there are four combinations between public input and national income. 
The combinations are [Ix{ri'x[G*x),Gx]，Ix [{nx{Gy),Gy] , / y [ny(G^y),Cy] and 
Iy [^'v[G*x),G*x] • What we want is to rank these four equilibria. Recall equation 
(5.23), we have the following relationship: 
Ix [ (nx(G^),G^] > Ix [ K ( G ^ ) , G ^ ] > Iy [ny{G*y),G*y] 
Also, we have equation (5.20) to clarify the ranking between Iy [riy(Gy), Gy] and 
Iy[ny{G*^),G*^]. 
Iy[ny(G*y),G*y] > / y [ n y ( G i ) , G ^ ] (5.24) 
If we combine equations (5.23) and (5.20), we will have: 
Ixl(nx(G;,),G*^] > Ixlnx(G*y),G*y]>Iy[ny(G*y),G*y]>Iylnr(G*^),G*^] 
(5.25) 
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The ranking illustrates the one of the main results of this study. If equilibrium 
X matches with the optimal level of public input Gy for equilibrium Y, we will call 
it a mismatching equilibrium X. On the other hand, if equilibrium Y mat(:hes with 
the optimal level of public input G \ for equilibrium X, it is called as a mismatching 
equilibrium Y. 
We have our last proposition of this studies: 
Proposition 9 If the government only chooses to provide public input to opti-
mize either equilibrium X or equilibrium F, the mismatching equilibrium Y is then 
inferior to any other possible equilibria according to the potential-Pareto criterion. 
Proposition 9 illustrates one of the main results of this study. As we can note, 
the mismatching equilibrium Y is the worst equilibrium among the four equilibria. 
The result has an interesting interpretation. Equilibrium X, which is completely 
specialized in producing high technology and capital intensive goods, is always 
interpreted as a economy in a developed state. On the contrary, equilibrium Y, 
which is completely specialized in low technology and labor intensive goods, is 
always interpreted as an economy in a developing state. As a result, the mis-
matching equilibrium Y can be interpreted as a developing country mat(.hiiig with 
a developed country optimal level of public input. From proposition 9, we know 
that the national income of this economy is the lowest among the four equilibria. 
The other interesting application is that the level of public input can represent 
a government policy for a specific industry. The adoption of an optimal level of 
public input for equilibrium X , G*x, is an optimal government policy which is 
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optimal for high technology goods. If a developing country adopts a government 
policy for high technology goods but the economy is still producing good V (a low 
technology goods), the national income will be undermined. From proposition 8, 
we can also note that if a developed country adopts a government policy which 
is optimal for low technology goods, national income will then be higher than the 
mismatching equilibrium V. 
CHAPTER 6 
Concluding Remarks 
This study provides a model to investigate the effect of public input in a multi-
ple equilibria, increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition framework. 
In the model, we establish a relationship between the public sector and the inter-
mediate sector. Since both sectors adopt capital as a factor of production. An 
increase in the level of public input or intermediate input will increase the rental 
rate for capital. A higher rental rate will lower the supplies of public input and 
intermediate input. As a result, there exists a trade-off between the level of pubic 
input and intermediate input. 
The negative relationship between the public and the intermediate s()ct,or ex-
plains some of the salient results in this study. The first important result is that 
government policy may not be able to help the economy to find a high technology 
equilibrium (equilibrium X). However, it is possible that government policy may 
push the economy to a low technology equilibrium (equilibrium Y). The result 
also reveals the necessary condition for the government to push the economy into 
a high technology oriented industry. The necessary condition is that the fraction 
of public input in the production function of Y should be larger than that in the 
production function of X. 
Moreover, we have derived an optimal level of public input for complete spe-
cialization in X and complete specialization in Y. We have also pointed out that 
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the optimal level of public level for equilibrium X can be larger or smaller than 
equilibrium Y. We have also illustrated that the optimal level of public input for 
the equilibrium which is completely specialized in good X can be larger or smaller 
than the equilibrium which is completely specialized in good Y. The value of op-
timal level of public input is a function of t,he ratio of the public input fraction cr^  
and the intermediate input fraction 队 Also, we found that the sufficient c ondition 
for the optimal level of public input for equilibrium X is larger than the optimal 
level of public input for equilibrium Y. The sufficient condition is that the ratio 
of public input fraction and intermediate input fraction (泛) f o r equilibrium X 
should be larger than the ratio (芸) fo r equilibrium Y. 
This study provides a welfare comparison between different equilibria. One of 
the salient finding is the fact that the equilibrium X with an optimal level of G*x 
should be larger than the equilibrium X with an optimal level of Gy. The result 
gives a rlear welfare implication of different equilibria in the model. Equilibrium 
Y is not only dominated by the equilibrium X for a given level of public input 
but is also dominated by the equilibrium X for an optimal level of public input. 
Equilibrium X is a more desirable equilibrium in the sense of a higher national 
income. 
This study also identifies an interesting case, which is the mismatching between 
different optimal levels of public input, and equilibria. When equilibrium Y is 
associated with the optimal level of public input for equilibrium X {G*x), national 
income will be inferior to any other possible equilibria associated with th(�optimal 
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level of public input. The equilibrium can be perceived as one in a developing 
country (equilibrium Y) that adopts an industrial policy favoring high technology 
industry. According to this study, for developing country to adopt an industrial 
policy favoring high technology industry, national income will be inferior to adopt 
an industrial policy favoring low technology industry. This study further suggests 
that if a developed country (equilibrium X) adopts an industrial policy favoring 
low technology industry, it is still better than a developing country to adopt a high 
technology industry policy. 
The successful experience in the East Asian Economies in the past twenty 
years attracts considerable attention. The East Asian Economies, especially the 
1 
Four Little Dragons, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, realized the 
Solow Model's predictions, in which countries converge to their balance(l growth 
paths. Those economies achieved higher growth rates than the industrial economies. 
They did catch up with the richer countries. The experience of the Four Little 
Dragons is invaluable because it is completely different from the other d(�veloping 
countries. De Long(1988) demonstrates that Argentina, Chile, East Germany, Ire-
landl, New Zealand, Portugal, and Spain has shown no tendency to converge with 
the developed industrial countries in the Baiimol's List^ 
The experience of Four Little Dragons can be summarized to the following 
features: taking advantage of foreign trade by specializing in standardized, labor-
1 Baiimol (1986) examines convergence from 1870 to 1979 among 16 developed countries. 
They are the Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Gerniany, Italy, 
Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, United Kingdom.. 
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intensive commodities, establishing private property rights and promoting foreign 
investment. The role of government is to increase investment in infrastructure and 
promote education. The paradigm renders the mentioned economies able to enjoy 
substantial growth in the past twenty years. 
In the recent years, those successful East Asian Economies try to transform 
their economy from a labor intensive economy to a capital intensive economy. 
The role of the government should be highly emphasized in the transformation 
process. The conventional wisdom believes that government should subsidize the 
high-tech industries, establish minimum-wage policy, and increase investment in 
infrastructure so as to facilitate the transformation process. 
This paper provides a basic framework to examine the public ixipiit with in-
creasing returns to scale in a small open economy. The main finding of this paper 
is that there exists a trade-off between the public sector and the degre(^ of divi-
sion of labor. The trade-off explains why an increase in infrastructure does not 
necessarily imply an increase in national income. Most importantly, this paper 
shows the mismatch equilibrium, that the equilibrium for a developing country is 
inferior to any other possible equilibria. Countries that are in the developing or 
middle-income level should consider government intervention very carefully. The 
mismatch between government industrial policy or public provision of infrastruc-
ture and development stage can destroy the established achievements of those 
countries. As Rodrik (1996) said in the concluding remarks "Without empirical 
relevance, government intervention to promote industrial diversification imist be 
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Appendix A: Second Order Condition for maximizing National Income with Respec1 
to Public Input 
Recall that the second order condition should be: 
爲 = * — ” 会 [ 『 ( 宁 ) 广 0 
i + H ^ r _ v i 
- / n _ Q \ n ^i 
+r7z h - 1] A i r K - - ^ G � — 2 L V b / . 
A � /G - r A 1 ^ - i 
- 啊 令 ^ , K - ( ^ ) ] G�-i (.1) 
0 L \ 0 / � 
where i = X, Y 
By collecting terms, we c,an simplify the above expression as: 
爲 = [ ¥ - ( 閉 厂 � � 1 - 2 
^ \ 
< 幽 — 1 ) 長 2 — 甲 [ 认 一 ( 明 ] 。 + 
J, h - 1 ] [ 队 - ( 明 ] 2 — T [ 认 — ( ^ ) ] G 
\ L \ / J L \ / J > 
where i — X, Y 
dP 
^ < G (.2) 
By definition the term n* — � K — ( ¾ ^ ) must be between 0 and 1. Moreover, 
• constant ip and 6 must also be between 0 and 1. As a result, the second differenti-
ation of G with respect to I must be negative. The optimal level of G* should be 
a maximum point for the national income function. 
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 7 
This appendix aims at proofing Ix [nx{G), G] > Iy [nY{G),G .‘ 
It is easy to observe the national income function I is an increasing function 
of n : 
^ 二 i f A n r - ' G � > 0 (.3) 
Relative Cost Functions are: 
‘ = © 得 矿 （.4) 
where 
A^ = 6x — ^Y and A(p = Lpx — <^ y 




u = ( ， ） a � （.6) 
\cixJ 
Recall the equilibrium conditions (3.25) and (3.26): 
n = 沾 - K o (.7) 
J = _ f k A - i ^ � ( ^ ^ i ^ ) " (.8) 
For a given level of G, we can find the number of firms m, which is implicitly 
defined by px{rn) = p. Then, we have Ix{m, G) > Iy{m, G). 
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p = Q 0 ^ n � ( ¥ r (.9) V L / 
The equation of ; ^ :g : ) ) is 
^ M“f( ’ r [ 〒 广 : 0 叫 知 + ^ 1 ( 1 0 ) 
“M&f(^n^]'G-[#+^] 
where 
Bx = ^ ^ 乂 會 1 、 乂 gy � n 
瓦 — " “ ^ ^ P ^ a i - V Z - i (.叫 
We can simplify the 聚 by using (.9) as: 
% - £ ] ^ | ^ \ £ 广 - 〃 0 ” 、 〜 ( 甲 广 ( . . ) 
= ( 動 〜 〜 - 〜 ( 早 广 . （.13) 
The ratio of national income function of equilibrium X and equilibrium Y : 
/X — � f K — my-^ i ^ ^ ^ - m r l i ^ f G ^ ^ 
— = m 中 — — - ~ ~ ^ ^ -c ( . 1 4 ) 
W V L 7 \iYK-(叫广[•叫〜Qay � ) 
_ \ b J� L L _ 
Ix_^(d>x^^'-' [^X + ^ f e ] 
“ V ^ ^ ' [ # + 命 ] • ’ 
We need to show that the 好 is larger than 1. It is equivalent to show: 
^'r' [0X + K/K{l - U)] > 0'/一1 [<i>Y + K/K{l - U)] (.16) 
To show that this equality holds, we have to define a new function: 
n(0,, U = 0^ ^—i ¢^^  + ^ / ^ ( 1 — � ) ] (.17) 
We need to show: 
^ ( ¢ x , ^ m ) > n ( ¢ y , ^ m ) (.18) 
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The problem can be reformulated as: 
0<(/>y 
[ M ^ M / 0 < O (.19) 
J oq) 
4>x 
It is equivalent to show 如(^爪)< 0 for all (0,^^) with 0 < 0y. 
^n(0,em) ,ey-2 \(C 1 � L , K \ I J 
- ^ T " = ^ p - ^ ) ( ^ + ^ 3 ^ j + ^ J (.20) 
= 0 〜 一 2 ^8y 一 (1 —〜） ( 0 + ^ ^ j 
^ ^ 一 ( 1 - 叫 ^ < 。 （.21) 
勢 学 … （.2) 
卿， 0 ) , . ,1 . � ( . , , _ ~ — ~ ~ = 0y(5y - (1 - dY) ‘ （.23) 
^y0y = Pv 一 ^Y + OL (1 一 /3y) (.24) 
^ H ^ = - ( l - a ) ( l - / 3 y ) < 0 (.25) 
From (.23), we observe that 例》:)is an increasing function of ¢. Given a level of 
public input C, (.25) implies 
犯。(么 0) < 0 for all 0 < 0 y (.26) 
0 0 
When there are multiple equilibria, necessarily uy < m < n,x, we have: 
m rix{G) 
I[nx{G),G]-I[ny{G),G] = j Iy[n(G),G] + J l!^[n{G).G] (.27) 
ny{G*) 爪 
+ {Ix[m{G),G]-Iy[m{G),G]} 
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